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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
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decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
It is easy to forget the impact of nuclear power on the international relations of South 
America. Only thirty years ago the pursuit of uranium-enrichment and ballistic-missile 
technologies by authoritarian military regimes in Argentina and Brazil led many to fear the 
emergence of a security dilemma with serious geopolitical ramications. e belief was 
widespread in the West and in the international community at large that both countries were 
trying to develop nuclear-weapons programmes of their own with a view to either equalising 
or surpassing each other’s technological capabilities – the kind of dynamic that could spiral 
out of control.  
Yet within roughly fteen years, between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, the context of 
the Brazil-Argentina nuclear relationship changed fundamentally. A train of events in Brasília 
and Buenos Aires revolutionised South America’s international politics and led both 
countries to rethink their national security doctrines; coordinate their foreign policies to deal 
with the global non-proliferation regime; impose new restraints on their own national 
nuclear programmes; and eventually co-sponsor a formal mechanism for mutual inspection 
of nuclear-related facilities. Some of these developments were driven by structural 
transformation – the implosion of authoritarian rule in both countries, nancial decay and 
greater dependence on global nance, and the eroding legitimacy of national nuclear 
programmes in the eyes of public opinion; some of them, however, were driven by key 
individuals: statesmen and diplomats who made a dierence through the contingent choices 
they made.  
By the late 1980s the Argentina-Brazil relationship had taken on characteristics that would 
have been inconceivable to observers twenty years earlier. is transformation fostered an 
incipient security community in the wider South American region that moved that part of 
the world toward becoming a zone of international peace, democratic governance, and 
market economies, where there was little or no incentive for major investments in 
nuclear-weapons technologies. 
Counterintuitively, Argentina and Brazil followed this path toward a stable peace while both 
were still military dictatorships. It was a case where political reconciliation did not follow 
social integration and economic interdependence, but the other way around. What ever 
happened?
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
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obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
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nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
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nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
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nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
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nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
LSE GLOBAL SOUTH UNIT
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Global South Unit
London School of Economics and Political Science
Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE. United Kingdom 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 7446. Email: gsu@lse.ac.uk
www.lse.ac.uk
Working Paper No. 4. 2015.
17
nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
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nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
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nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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In Brazil things were never as straightforward, given the more prominent role of the armed 
forces in the nuclear sector. Among those in uniform were voices favouring the development 
of a nuclear-weapons programme some day in the future; these, however, were never 
dominant nor managed to gain political traction inside Brazil. e winner of the power 
struggle for resources and authority over Brazil’s nuclear programme from the 1970s onwards 
was the Navy, the one force that actively argued against weaponisation, and oered a vision 
of nuclear technology centred instead around nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
argument mirrored the debate in Argentina, being couched in terms of technological 
development and spillover. 
Finances mattered as well for both sides: the major changes undertaken by Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1980s could not have occurred without the acquiescence of the military and the 
nuclear sector to the new economic realities in both countries. e high costs of maintaining 
nuclear programmes made little sense in a context of nancial upheaval and budgetary 
scarcity. 
e central question this paper raises is this: How do the newly declassied documents and 
interviews illumine the foregoing two rival pictures?
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED. 
In this section I seek to systematise the core lessons to be learnt from the set of primary 
sources now available to researchers into the origins of Argentine-Brazil nuclear cooperation. 
e ndings are presented in two parts: rst, attention focusses on the role of domestic actors 
in shaping foreign nuclear policy; next, bilateral geopolitical dynamics is taken into account 
in the context of an evolving non-proliferation regime.
Domestic actors: the military, diplomats, scientists and politicians. 
We know that the origins of cooperation lie in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at a time when 
both countries were run by authoritarian military governments. Greater levels of cooperation 
and transparency preceded both countries’ transition to civilian rule. What we did not know 
before about the story of nuclear rapprochement was the relative weight of men in uniform, 
politicians, and diplomats in Argentina’s and Brazil’s domestic power struggle. 
e military mattered on both sides because, for all the secrecy involved in their treatment of 
nuclear aairs, all parties realised that nuclear cooperation could operate as a common 
defensive shield against an intrusive international non-proliferation regime. In an attempt to 
preserve some place for their nuclear technology programmes at home – especially in face of 
the militant anti-nuclear policies of the Carter administration – they launched a bilateral 
programme of nuclear cooperation. In order to bring this o, they rst had to resolve their 
energy and water disputes in the Parana River region, which had fuelled a great deal of 
mutual resentment throughout the 1970s. Many thought them a function of a military 
mentality in both Brasília and Buenos Aires; however, it was in fact the military on both sides 
who decided in 1979 to seal a deal on the water dispute. e 1979 Itaipu-Corpus Treaty of 
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil for the exchange of technical information, 
material, and products on all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, led to the rst visit, in May 
1980, by a Brazilian President to Argentina in more than four decades. After this treaty both 
countries engaged in active nuclear cooperation. 
For their part, the foreign ministries of both countries contributed to the nuclear 
rapprochement in very specic ways. More than any other sector of government, they were 
sensitive to the diplomatic costs of remaining isolated from international non-proliferation 
regimes. e belief took hold on both sides that nuclear rapprochement between themselves 
would moderate the international pressures to adhere to international non-proliferation 
regimes like the NPT. 
e foreign ministries also devised a way for political leaders to reveal to the public what their 
respective secret programmes had achieved by coordinating their announcements 
beforehand. ey also forged a language of shared interest in nuclear aairs; after all, 
professional diplomats from both sides had been actively cooperating in the United Nations 
and other international fora since at least the 1950s. ey knew full well that they could 
easily develop a common stance on most scores pertaining to the global non-proliferation 
regime. In the 1980s they pressed forward with a common way of framing nuclear issues in 
Vienna and New York. While this never produced a single joint non-proliferation policy 
between the two countries, it certainly did produce a veneer of commonality that had been 
lacking before. As the 1980s progressed, the two sides’ diplomatic stances resembled each 
other more and more. is was critical in suspending disbelief abroad that Argentina and 
Brazil were not engaged in a nuclear arms race that could spiral out of control. If the basis for 
reassert authority at home, tame an unruly military complex, and build up an image of 
statesmanship that was bound to be instrumental in the domestic struggles to come. For his 
part, Brazilian general João Figueiredo considered himself interested to move toward 
cooperation with Argentina as a way of signalling to his colleagues in uniform that Brazil was 
indeed to transition to civilian rule. Opening up internationally, to Argentina but to the rest 
of South America as well, would then feed back into the political liberalisation at home.
e second school of thought argues that, for all the mistrust characterising the bilateral 
relationship in the late 1970s, this was not a security dilemma. is version of events is best 
represented by Doyle (2008), Redick (1995), Reiss (1995), and Wrobel (1994). Yes, the 
military establishments on both sides viewed each other with suspicion and even planned, 
contingently, for war with one another, but there was more cooperation and convergence 
than meets the eye. 
is account also has a geopolitical side to it. It argues that Brazil and Argentina actually 
share in common a view of the international non-proliferation regime as intrusive, 
discriminatory, and detrimental to their own quest for technology acquisition. e regime in 
general and US non-proliferation policy in particular – especially under Jimmy Carter – is 
what drove Argentina and Brazil together. e more their own relations with the regime and 
with the United States deteriorated, as they did throughout the mid-1970s, the more both 
countries found common ground for bilateral cooperation. is, the argument goes, was 
stronger than any fears of each other they may have harboured. Neither country faced an 
imminent threat from the other, nor from extra-regional actors. “Cooperation was possible 
because Argentine and Brazilian security concerns about each other were never overriding.  
is fact weakened national security arguments for the development of nuclear weapons.” 
(Doyle, p. 315)
And there is a domestic-political strand to this argument as well. In the case of Argentina, the 
nuclear programme should be presumed to be about acquiring and developing nuclear 
technology for civilian purposes which might spill over into Argentine industries more 
broadly, absent any evidence that any power-broker ever considered the possibility of a 
nuclear weapons programme. e upshot was an attitude of empathy toward Brazil rather 
than rivalry: Argentine personnel in the nuclear sector shared the same views as their 
counterparts in Brazil, a phenomenon that some have portrayed as an incipient cross-border 
epistemic community. 
e body of relevant literatures that seek to account for the absence of a spiralling 
nuclear-technology arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
– and the origins of an unexpected pattern of cooperation instead – has evolved over the past 
twenty years. Existing accounts variously emphasise the geopolitical, economic, normative 
and domestic-political sides to the story. e resulting account is rich enough not to be easily 
contained in one single set of theories or concepts, or within a single overarching narrative. 
For all the wealth of existing knowledge about the origins of nuclear cooperation between 
Brazil and Argentina, the opportune moment has now come to revert to that recent past in 
order to assess it anew, inasmuch as secret documents produced at the time in Argentina, 
Brazil and the United States have become available for research for the rst time, whilst at 
long last key historical actors are sharing their recollections. ese developments enable 
historians and social scientists to develop the rst detailed, documented account of what 
exactly happened and why. 
is working paper begins by establishing what has been known about the case previously, 
then moves on to specify what the new ndings are. At the end it is assessed how sustainable 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation is likely to be.
TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT. 
All students of the nuclear relationship between Brazil and Argentina agree that bilateral 
tension peaked in the mid-1970s over major infrastructure works in the River Plate basin. To 
be sure, low-level geopolitical and diplomatic competition had been integral to the 
relationship since the colonial period two hundred years earlier, with mutual suspicion deeply 
seated. We also know that mistrust was recurrent on each side as the other began to develop 
nuclear technology from the 1950s onwards; although we do not know what eective role 
distrust had in creating an interest in nuclear technological development in the rst place. 
e drama of Argentina-Brazil relations in the late 1970s was all the more dangerous due to 
the scarcity of high-level contacts between the two sides; e.g. no visits Heads of State since 
World War II, no major bilateral committees and a political culture of distancing. 
From a proliferation perspective too, the late 1970s and early 1980s were the most delicate 
period in the region’s history, as both governments actively pursued uranium-enrichment and 
reprocessing, plus mid- and long-range ballistic missile technologies. We now know that the 
CIA had estimated at the time that there were major incentives on both sides for nuclear 
weaponisation.
Working within this matrix, scholars developed two alternative schools of thought. e rst 
saw a security dilemma in play, and is best represented by Resende-Santos (2002) and 
Kupchan (2010). According to this view, “each nation sought to develop the technological 
capability as an insurance policy against the other’s nuclear ambitions … by 1976 strategists 
on both sides had concluded that the two rivals were nuclear-capable” (Resende-Santos, p. 
95). On this view, whatever bilateral nuclear cooperation emerged in the 1980s was a 
function of changes both to the regional balance of power, with Argentina becoming ever less 
capable of competing economically, technologically or diplomatically with Brazil, at a time 
when military establishments in both countries were on the retreat, as democratically elected 
civilian leaders reached oce.
e geopolitical side to this story can be summarised as follows. Argentina almost went to 
war with Chile in 1978 and then fought and lost a conventional war against the United 
Kingdom in 1982. e military junta running the country at the time came to be seen as a 
pariah in the eld of human rights, becoming increasingly isolated. At the same time the 
national economy shrank and de-industrialised. In the process, Argentina’s nuclear sector was 
rst paralysed due to lack of funding, and then progressively dismantled in the face of other, 
more pressing priorities. While Brazil also suered dire economic straits and underwent a 
painful transition from authoritarian rule, it nevertheless managed in that period to 
consolidate and even improve its regional position in South America. Its nuclear sector faced 
enormous hurdles, yet Brazil worked tirelessly towards uranium-enrichment and the creation 
of a minuscule but established nuclear industrial complex. Faced with such a fait accompli, 
Argentina had little choice but to reach out and inch toward better relations with Brasília. On 
this account, nuclear rapprochement is to a large extent the result of a weakened Argentina’s 
attempt to institutionalise nuclear relations with a stronger Brazil that might otherwise move 
forward with its own nuclear plans without any commitments to its neighbour. 
e domestic-political side of this version goes like this: nuclear rapprochement must be seen 
as part and parcel of the transition to civilian rule in both countries. President Raul Alfonsín 
of Argentina sought cooperation with Brazil soon after taking oce in late 1983 in the belief 
that layers of international commitments in the eld of non-proliferation would help him 
e return to civilian rule in both countries in the 1980s was important in facilitating the 
nuclear rapprochement. Argentina hoped to end the diplomatic and economic isolation it 
endured in the wake of the Falklands War and in the process distance itself from the legacy of 
the previous military regime, while Brazil saw increased cooperation with Argentina as a 
chance to expand its economic inuence in the region and to lessen its dependency on the 
U.S. Both Alfonsín and Sarney were eager to consolidate civilian rule and to end their relative 
isolation in international aairs. For Argentina this isolation resulted from the Falklands, the 
atrocities that the military regime had perpetrated against its own people, and nancial 
collapse; while in Brazil public opinion pressurised the governing elites to liberalise the 
political system and to send the military back to the barracks. e domestic power-political 
reasons behind bilateral engagement were distinct yet complementary. 
Presidential diplomacy was also critical to the process of rapprochement. In July 1987 the 
Presidential declarations began. At the invitation of President Alfonsín of Argentina, 
President Sarney of Brazil visited the Pilcaniyeu nuclear facility near Bariloche. Before then, 
Argentina had never made that facility accessible to the public, which rendered the nature of 
the visit even more historic. e Viedma Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy they signed on 
that occasion signalled a joint commitment to end the secrecy surrounding the countries’ 
nuclear programmes and to deepen bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld. In April 1988 
Sarney reciprocally invited Alfonsín to visit Brazil’s hitherto secret nuclear installation in São 
Paulo, after which the Ipero Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy was issued announcing the 
decision to set up a permanent commission on nuclear cooperation. Again, in November 
1988, Sarney visited Argentina’s Ezeiza facility near Buenos Aires, where Sarney and Alfonsín 
issued the Ezeiza Joint Statement on Nuclear Policy rearming their earlier statements.  
ese Presidential statements served to restore civilian control over the two national nuclear 
programs and signal this decision to the international community. ey set goals and 
timetables. It is important to highlight that both Alfonsín and Sarney took unilateral steps to 
bring about a nuclear rapprochement, as witness Argentina’s announcement of its success in 
uranium enrichment in 1983 and its brieng of Brazilian authorities before the 
announcement was made public. Brazil reciprocated with its 1987 announcement of its 
capability of enriching uranium. 
e civilian leadership also conceived of nuclear rapprochement as a way to cut costs. Facing 
a collapsing economy, hyper-ination, and a hostile global nancial environment, both 
Alfonsín and Sarney were particularly sensitive to public expenditure on nuclear 
development. Given a political inability and indeed unwillingness to simply shut the 
programmes down, the leaders sought to frame them in ways that could lessen international 
pressures and sanctions. (In the early 1980s the U.S. Congress in particular seriously debated 
proposals to sanction both countries.) is was far from easy, insofar as the respective nance 
ministries of and certain corporate interests in both Argentina and Brazil had come to view 
the continuation of their nuclear programmes as a hindrance to domestic economic growth, 
in that it discouraged foreign investment. 
e connexion between their domestic nuclear programmes and these countries’ ability to 
cope in an ever more globalised nancial system became even more of an issue in the late 
1980s, when Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil won the vote on a 
promise of reining-in ination. Both Menem and Collor were willing and able to limit the 
role of the military in nuclear decision-making, and both were more committed to nancial 
liberalisation. Menem went so far as thinking through the privatisation of a big chunk of the 
Argentine nuclear programme, while Collor created incentives for the private sector to absorb 
at least a part of Brazil’s nuclear industrial operations (Solingen, 1994).
None of the above is to say that the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship evolved into a 
trusting one very easily. Plenty of evidence points to suspicions, misperception, mutual 
recrimination, and a recurring frustration at the lack of progress in bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. But nobody on either side ever seemed to have feared that the other side might 
achieve nuclear latency or weaponisation, in any way that would have created powerful 
incentives for rivalry.
Geopolitics and the non-proliferation regime 
Joint Argentine-Brazilian opposition to the non-proliferation regime was to become a source 
of stability and condence-building. Over time, the regime’s evolution at the global level contributed to 
facilitate Argentine-Brazilian cooperation in the nuclear eld. Consider the following. 
Both nations resented the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, rst organised in secret 
by Henry Kissinger in London in 1974 and made public in 1977. e Group proceeded to 
restrict nuclear exports by nuclear states to non-nuclear ones. By the late 1970s both Brazil 
and Argentina were energetically trying to secure a seat for themselves in the Group or, 
alternatively, to weaken its ability to “lay down the law” to them. In the process, they were 
obliged to exchange information and construct common positions on the core exports issues 
– a process that socialised to each other the diplomats, military men, scientists and politicians 
of both sides. Bilateral nuclear cooperation was to a large extent conceived-of as a strategy to 
avoid external pressures from US non-proliferation policy and from the non-proliferation 
regime itself.
e result of this process was that an incipient policy of mutual transparency arose between 
the two countries. For instance, when constructing its gaseous diusion enrichment facility 
in 1983, Argentina notied Brazil before any public announcement was made; likewise, 
regarding its gas centrifuge facility Brazil reciprocated the courtesy in 1987 with a personal 
letter from President Sarney to President Alfonsín.  e visit of President Sarney to the 
Argentine facility in July 1987 was an important moment in the nuclear condence-building 
process between the two countries as it moved them closer to bilateral nuclear transparency. 
e gesture also served to arm Presidential control of both nuclear programmes, over the 
objections of various military ocials (for an interpretation, see Redick, p. 43)  
Bilateral communication did, however, break down over the Brazilian military’s “parallel 
programme” and its nuclear test facility at Cachimbo, which came to light in late 1986 and 
early 1987, but which was still being denied by the Brazilian government up until 1990. Even 
though it was never ocially informed of the facility, Argentina had known of its existence. 
e Argentine authorities “chose not to allow it to derail nuclear rapprochement … a 
testimony to [Argentina’s] commitment to the process” (Redick, p. 23). e interesting 
question is, Why did they act thus?
Documents about Brazil’s programme are scarce. e extant archival evidence together with 
the interviews we conducted suggest that the project sought to achieve low-level enrichment 
capability. Any talk of highly enriched uranium references a distant, indeterminate future. 
e “autonomous” or “parallel” programme, as it was soon dubbed in local parlance, was 
narrow in scope. Eschewing any ambition to develop a nuclear industrial complex, it 
ventured small-scale research facilities for enrichment technology, some of which were to 
remain secret. e system was largely decentralised, with the Army, Navy and Air Force each 
having their own laboratories, personnel and budgets, not out of any grand strategic plan, but 
out of rivalry between the armed services over tight budgets. We now know that the 
Argentines were well aware of this.
Argentine awareness of the context of Brazil’s nuclear policy was crucial: the Argentine 
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nuclear competition could be seen to be fading, then global concern over proliferation in 
South America could begin to recede. is in turn served to accelerate and institutionalise 
bilateral nuclear cooperation and, at least to a degree, it transferred nuclear expertise from 
military to civilian control. 
What about the scientists? In January 1977 the governments of Argentina and Brazil had 
issued a joint communiqué stressing the need for bilateral cooperation in the nuclear eld 
and systematic exchanges of nuclear technology. e technical exchanges were central to the 
nuclear rapprochement, as the respective nuclear energy commission ocials built up 
personal relationships with their counterparts from the other country. e scientic 
communities in both countries worried that the US and Western Europe would continue to 
deny technology transfers, and both saw closer Argentine-Brazilian cooperation as a tool to 
transcend an ever more restrictive global regime. ese fears were proven well-founded in 
1977, when US President Jimmy Carter convinced West Germany to deny uranium 
reprocessing and enrichment technologies to Brazil. ese developments spurred 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation as Argentina, too, was involved in a heated dispute 
with the US over the right to buy a third power reactor and heavy water production facility 
without accepting full-scope safeguards. 
e feebleness of any security dilemma dynamic between Brazil and Argentina in the nuclear 
eld seems to have been abetted by a transnational networks of scientists – an epistemic 
community of sorts which arose between the nuclear sectors of Brazil and Argentina, 
consisting of the interpersonal relationships between experts met in the course of technical 
training in the Europe or the United States, reinforced as they travelled the world to 
international conferences and other professional activities. For all of the mistrust between 
both sides’ military and diplomatic corps, their nuclear scientic communities worked to 
dilute concern about each other’s nuclear intentions. Trained together in Europe and the 
United States, regular contact was common in academic and professional settings. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a signicant ow of information was maintained at a practical, 
unocial level, and that scientists from neither country ever seriously considered that the 
other side might want to move toward weaponisation. Even when high-ranking ocials in 
Brazil contemplated the possibility that Argentina might one day develop an explosive, they 
were not overcome by any sense of urgency or fear, according to historical documents.
decision to move forward with bilateral cooperation required an attitude that was accepting 
of exceptions on the part of Brazil and of a possibly slower pace of rapprochement. 
Interviewees on the Argentine side repeat time and again that they were aware of how dicult 
it was for Brazil’s more complex system of nuclear governance to move in tandem toward 
higher levels of bilateral cooperation. e Argentine policy was to exercise “strategic 
patience”, a stance they could aord because fears of Brazil’s future nuclear intentions were – 
contrary to what many people have thought at the time and since – minimal. is reinforced a 
dynamic whereby Argentina would be the one to push for higher levels of cooperation – and later 
on, transparency, – while accepting that Brazil might move grudgingly and more slowly. 
is is a rather impressive revelation. After all, suspicions had been growing around the world 
throughout the 1980s that Brazil was hiding a nuclear weapons programme. But this had not 
been merely a function of the unsafeguarded parallel programme; Brazil’s activities 
surrounding missile technology had also raised eyebrows in the international community. 
Starting in 1979, Brasília sought to design and build its own satellites, a rocket to deploy 
them to low earth orbit (VLS), and a launching site in the northern coastal town of 
Alcântara. Reports at the time suggested that Brazilian engineers were assisting Iraq in 
extending the range of and providing replacement parts for Scud-B ballistic missiles 
purchased from the Soviet Union, and that Brazil had transferred Astros-2 artillery rocket 
systems to Iraq during its war with Iran. ere were also accounts of Libya-Brazil 
missile-technology cooperation. Brazil soon found itself on the receiving end of an embargo 
imposed by a newly created Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which cut it o 
from foreign technologies. By 1992 the US Department of Commerce had listed two of 
Brazil’s Sonda rockets, plus the VLS rocket and other ballistic missiles, as projects of concern. 
Argentina, which had its own Condor programme, seems not to have feared Brazil, but on 
the contrary to have found common cause with it, rst to resist and then gradually to 
negotiate adherence to the MTCR – not jointly with Brazil, to be sure, but surely with an eye 
on Brazil’s pace and goals.
What drove Brazil to partner up with Argentina in ways that would limit its own policy 
choices? Our research programme yielded no compelling evidence that Brazil was driven by 
“security dilemma sensitivity”, a situation in which Brazilian ocials exercised self-restraint 
in their own nuclear programme in the knowledge that their Argentine counterparts would 
respond in kind. e longstanding pattern had been that the one country’s acquisition of 
nuclear technology would push the other to make technological advances of its own, and so 
forth. We found instead that Brazilian leaders did not think Argentine progress in nuclear 
technology was threatening or worrying enough to merit a targeted response.
Confronted with the Brazilian decision to set up an unsafeguarded programme, Argentine 
ocials in the early 1980s sought to negotiate with Brasília a joint communiqué renouncing 
PNEs. (Brazil was to turn down Argentine overtures for the next ten years.) At that point 
Argentina underwent a rapid decline, plunging into a steep economic crisis; threatening war 
with neighbouring Chile; and in 1982 launching and losing a conventional war with the 
United Kingdom. A year later the Argentine military dictatorship collapsed, and their civilian 
successors were adamant about de-militarising foreign policy and rebuilding regional 
relationships. By 1984 Argentine military academies were no longer teaching that Brazil was 
the most likely enemy in a regional war scenario. 
Our second nding is that this period also saw a slow but marked shift in Brazil’s own 
regional strategies. Whereas no Brazilian Head of State had ever set foot in Colombia, Peru 
or Venezuela before 1982, after that date Brasília began to expand its regional ties and 
relationships. Key to this process was the emerging diplomatic entente with Argentina, under 
which successive Brazilian administrations slowly but surely agreed to become embedded in 
a set of nuclear governance agreements with Argentina: rst establishing regular nuclear 
consultations, then setting up a protocol for mutual inspections. 
Brazil began to adopt the view that a common front with Argentina would actually work as 
a shield against the ever more intrusive global non-proliferation regime. Opening up to 
Argentina, albeit marginally, was not about bringing Brazil’s nuclear programme under tight, 
internationally monitored controls, but rather about resisting international pressures to join 
the non-proliferation club. 
HOW SUSTAINABLE IS NUCLEAR RAPPROCHEMENT, LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE?
Soon after signing the NPT in 1998, Brazil quietly revived plans to enrich uranium 
industrially and reignited discussions about nuclear propulsion for submarines. e 
government resumed construction of the Angra II power plant that went into operation in 
2002. Talk of a revived nuclear programme never took o, however, as the country was 
plunged into a cycle of nancial instability and low economic growth. e nuclear issue only 
resurfaced during the 2002 presidential campaign. At a rally in 2002 then-candidate Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, President from 2003 to 2011 oered a scathing critique of the NPT – 
and his predecessor’s decision to sign on to it – before a military audience. 
Once in oce, Lula revamped the nuclear programme. His administration moved ahead with 
the construction of an industrial enrichment centre in Resende that became operational in 
2004. is facility fell under international inspections, but Lula invoked the proviso that 
inspectors be denied visual access to the centrifuges so long as industrial espionage remains a 
threat. e Lula administration also moved ahead with plans to build a nuclear-propulsion 
submarine. 
A series of statements by high-ranking Brazilian ocials caught worldwide attention. In 2004 
the Minister of Science and Technology publicly declared that Brazil should acquire the 
knowhow to build nuclear artefacts. He was removed from his post as a result and the 
government had to issue a statement denying that the Minister was speaking on its behalf. In 
2006 Brazil’s Deputy Foreign Minister gave a speech questioning whether Brazil would in the 
future want to remain a party to the NPT. Vice President José Alencar stated, “A nuclear 
weapon that is a deterrent is of great value for a country that owns 15 thousand square 
kilometers of borders to its west, and an ocean of deep-sea oil of about four million square 
kilometers”. e Oce of the Presidency quickly denied that this was ocial policy, but 
Alencar made similar remarks soon afterwards without being disciplined.
During the early Lula years Brazil publicly resisted the notion that Additional Protocols to the 
safeguard agreements should grant inspectors expanded rights to access nuclear facilities. e 
argument was such instruments are not only too intrusive on countries like Brazil, but that they 
benet nuclear-armed states to the detriment of non-nuclear-armed states. is led to hardnosed 
negotiations with the IAEA, which remained critical of Brazil’s policy of visual denial. 
e 2008 National Defence Strategy of Brazil states that Brazil will make no additional 
non-proliferation commitments until nuclear-armed states take eective steps to disarm. 
at same year Brazil and Argentina agreed to establish a Binational Nuclear Energy 
Committee to enrich uranium, produce radiological medical supplies, develop applications 
for agriculture, and design and build research reactors.
roughout the 2000s Brazil engaged in more nuclear diplomacy than it ever had before. 
Since 1998 it has joined the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NPT signatories calling for 
global nuclear disarmament in line with the NPT. In addition, Brazil presided over the 2000 
Conference on Disarmament, the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and the 2007 
International Panel on Fissile Materials. 
In 2010 Brazil and Turkey attempted to broker an agreement with Iran. ey acted on the 
assumption that the tightening sanctions against Iran would further alienate the Islamic 
Republic, polarize international public discourse, and raise global tensions. e initiative 
brought US-Brazil relations to a new low (an episode that has been studied elsewhere). What 
is important to highlight is that the current evolution of the non-proliferation regime 
vis-à-vis Iran has reawakened Brazil’s critical stance. 
From Brasília’s perspective, to sanction Iran – an NPT member – and to disallow it to develop 
uranium-enrichment technologies under IAEA supervision creates an unacceptable 
precedent. After all, in Brazilian eyes Iran is nowhere near the ability to produce a nuclear 
artefact and its leaders know that any move in that direction may be fatal to their regime. Iran 
may well have cheated on its treaty commitments in the past, and does owe greater 
clarication of its own nuclear goals, but the application of tighter sanctions, international 
discussions of the use of force, and the emphasis on regime change is hardly the best recipe 
for a solution. 
Brasília worries instead that US non-proliferation policies are themselves a destabilising 
factor in the non-proliferation regime by rewarding a non-NPT member like India with a 
bilateral agreement; turning a blind eye to nuclear Israel; and moving painfully slowly – if at 
all – toward disarmament. In the Brazilian view, there is a real risk that the United States will 
only adhere to the non-proliferation norms as long as they continue to grant it multilaterally 
sanctioned tools to punish a country that the US unilaterally has decided to include in its 
“axis of evil”.  
Brazil’s apparent nuclear renaissance in the 2000s had a direct impact on Argentina. Buenos 
Aires became concerned that Brazil’s nuclear intentions may be in a state of ux, and that 
existing commitments and linkages may have to be readapted. Argentina in the 2000s was 
keen on nding niches where cooperation with Brazil might be possible, as seen in the string 
of new agreements initiated by Buenos Aires in 2008, 2010 and 2011. 
At rst sight, then, Argentina in the 2000s set out to revive its 1980s strategy: to increase 
levels of institutionalised bilateral nuclear cooperation with Brazil, emphasising the potential 
for joint technological development and joint participation in the global nuclear market. As 
WikiLeaks documents have shown, the Argentine government is concerned that Brazil will 
abandon it in the future. In the “unlikely event” that Brazil “backed out of the 
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Controls of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or, 
worse, developed a nuclear weapons capacity […] Argentina would choose a course of 
developing and deploying an advanced peaceful nuclear technology to demonstrate capacity, 
without actually going the way of nuclear weapons. [Government ocials] mentioned a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker as such a demonstration project.” (WikiLeaks, 2009).
And yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Brazil’s recent nuclear activities have triggered 
a set of security dilemma dynamics. First of all, investment in the Brazilian nuclear industry 
has been uneven, with severe cuts and budgetary constraints limiting the scope of nuclear 
policies from 2012 onwards. e current downwards trajectory of the Brazilian economy and 
public-sector expenditures points towards little policy space for nuclear initiatives. In fact, the 
Angra III power plant has been postponed, and at this junction there are serious doubts as to 
the nancial viability of the nuclear submarine project. Second, the Argentine-Brazilian 
nuclear relationship in the 2000s takes place in a context of deep cooperative ties among 
nuclear-sector personnel, inspectors, military personnel, and the diplomatic corps. e ties 
that bind, at least for now, seem to be resilient enough to prevent any mutual mistrust from 
spiralling into the competitive dynamics that characterize a security dilemma.  
e administration of Brazilian President Dilma Rousse (2011-present) seems to be aware 
of Argentine concerns, for she and her Foreign Minister have been speaking the language of 
reassurance. Her rst presidential trip to Buenos Aires in January 2011 produced a set of 
agreements in the eld of joint nuclear technological development. Bilateral nuclear 
cooperation is thus rmly rooted enough to remain a very signicant constraint on the 
national nuclear policies of both Brazil and Argentina.
A further issue is the Additional Protocol to the NPT. is has been divisive within Argentina. 
Some argue that signing it would build new levels of international condence, which would not 
only incentivise Brazil to follow suit but provide space for a revamping of its nuclear programme. 
ose who disagree point out that it would render ABACC redundant and useless, eectively 
shutting down the one channel it currently has to “peep into” the Brazilian nuclear programme. 
From a legal standpoint, Argentina would have to withdraw from the Quadripartite Agreement it 
signed with Brazil, ABACC and the Atomic Agency in Vienna before proceeding to sign the AP.
For its own part, Brazil is rmly committed to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as 
mandated by its 1988 Constitution, and to a range of international agreements to which it is 
party. To a signicant degree Brazil has moved toward the liberal international compact. But 
rm commitments to economic stability and democracy at home – and a willingness to put 
in place comprehensive safeguards under an umbrella of international agreements – do not 
exclude a self-identity based on the image of a non-status quo power committed also to 
challenging existing norms and institutions.
While there are no indications or reasons to believe that Brazil will retreat from its NPT 
commitments, its predominant stance is one of caution in face of the global non-proliferation 
regime’s growing obtrusiveness into its domestic pursuits. From the standpoint of the policy 
community in Brasília, picking and choosing from the basket of rules on oer has paid o in 
the past and there is no indication that this approach will change in the near future. 
us far, their shared rejection of the Additional Protocol to the NPT has drawn Brazil and 
Argentina closer together. Indeed, it may be the case that their joint resistance to the Protocol 
has further reinforced their commitment to a common nuclear policy. ey consider their 
resistance has paid o up to this point, as with the formal agreement of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group in 2011 that, for the purpose of the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the 
IAEA is to be seen as a provisional alternative to the Additional Protocol.  
But if history provides any guide, for all the deep roots that bilateral nuclear cooperation has 
laid in the past three decades, the structures currently in place have worked merely to manage 
the currents of mutual suspicion and mistrust; they have not to date transformed the nature 
of the relationship into one where the possibility of a nuclear-technology competition is o 
the map. It is no wonder, then, that experts in the nuclear sectors of both countries insist on 
the enduring importance of a system of mutual safeguards and inspection schemes as we 
move into the future. 
What the newly released materials and the latest oral histories reveal is that there were 
moments in history when it was plausible to imagine less cooperative trajectories for the 
bilateral nuclear relationship. A great deal of the cooperation that eventuated has depended 
on key personalities and their skill at instrumentalising nuclear rapprochement with the 
other side so as to ght their political battles at home. And much of the mutual cooperative 
eort was also a structural function of the shared perception of frailty in the face of an ever 
more intrusive global non-proliferation regime that is dominated by the major nuclear 
powers. It is the management of these factors by the future leaders of both countries that will 
shape the contours of the bilateral nuclear relationship to come.
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